The Foreground of
Afghanistan Issue and its Influence on Regional and International Situation
School of Advanced International and Area Studies
June 24-26, 2011, Shanghai
Yasin Rasouli، I would like to express my gratitude to my fellows at the Advanced School of Security Area Studies for organizing this symposium and their warm hospitality. In addition, I would like to thank them for giving me an opportunity to have a part.
In this paper, I reviewed the recent developments and debates on National Reconciliation in Afghanistan. It will analyse the nature of insecurity and insurgency and the engagement of the regional and international actors. The paper explores the peace process and its prospects of success.
1. Background
The history of rebellion and reconciliation in Afghanistan is a long story; both the insurgents and the government are utilizing the previous experiences. Tribes revolted against the King Amanullah in 1927 that led to the collapse of Afghanistan modernised government. Similarly Mujahideen’s nationwide uprising in 1980s against the Soviet-backed government once again revived the discussion on insurgency and reconciliation. The Mujahideen groups, who initially fought against the Afghan regime, later competed with each other over control of power with each other for years, make up the main body of the current government.
At present there are three insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan and are: Hezbe Islami Party’s which predominantly are operative in Northern and Eastern provinces. Some of the leaders of the party currently occupied the key position in Karzai’s administration.The Taliban’s leaders, Mullah Mohammad Omar and Quetta Shora, are active in Southern parts of the country, and the Haqqani networks in Eastern provinces. These are the main gropus that President Karzai attempts to bring them on the negotiationtable.
The process of micro reconciliation has started since 2006, through the National Reconciliation Commission, to reintegrate those Taliban who put down their guns and went back to normal life. The commission has used economic and social incentives[1], More than five thousands of Taliban have been released to go back to their communities; although, some of them recruited by Taliban again.
2. The Nature of Insecurity and Insurgency
The Taliban, as the main armed opposition body, has mostly been raised as the second generation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan’s refugee camps, and have been trained and mobilized from religious school networks, or so-called madrasas, in Pakistan. Most of those religious students who were recruited by Taliban have not lived in Afghanistan, and are unfamiliar with Afghan cultures and traditions.
In overall, all internal and external dimension of insurgency in Afghanistan should be analyzed together; highlighting one factor and denying other features will lead to imperfect results. In Bonn Conference in 2001, not just Taliban but also some other political parties was not given a part, however, most of them could join the political system. In currant Afghan parliament and cabinet, former Mujahidin and all rivals, who once fought each other and even some members of Taliban, could work together. In fact, the current government is the most diverse government in the recent history of Afghanistan.
For analysing the reconciliation process, it is necessary to understand the nature of insecurity in Afghanistan and the Taliban movement. Insecurity in Afghanistan goes beyond the insurgents. It is rooted in the weakness of the state institutions, corruption and inefficient local administration, and drug trafficking, latter of which may only exist in insecure conditions. In fact, many internal and external factors are going in favour of continuing conflicts.
Taliban haven’t changed their tactics in Afghanistan. Suicide bombings, burning schools and roadside bombing are common Taliban’s most techniques for fighting and creating fear and insecurity. According to a recent United Nation report released in March 2011, of 2,800 civilian casualties in 2010, three-quarters were caused by the Taliban.
3. Talibanization of Afghanistan or Afghanization of Taliban
What would Peace look like? What would the Taliban likely to do, should they return to power? This is a complicated question to which there no simple answer. Some scenarios seem bleak especially for women which raised concern amongst the woman rights activist. Are the Taliban are going to enforce the rigid version of Sharia law? Religious police will flog women in streets, the media will be closed, all men will be forced once again to grow long beard, and women to be confined at home. Taliban would provide a safe haven to Al-Qaeda and other extremist networks in Afghanistan posing security threat to regional and international peace and security.
When the Taliban were in power girls were prohibited to attend school. While today there are 7 million students out of which 37% are females. The Taliban had banned media except the Voice of Sharia radio which was the Taliban’s official broadcasting, while there are now scores of radio stations, numbers of TV stations, and more than 100 active press titles, According to official statistics, around six million Afghan refugees have returned home since the fall of the Taliban.
Some analysts, including opposition, consider the engagement with the Taliban as a “Pashton solution” at the expense of other ethnic groups and women rights. In number of occasions, President Karzi has tried to bring consensus amongst the internal players, specifically, the North Alliance, women activists, liberal media by ensuring them that there would be no compromise on the principles stipulated in the constitution of Afghanistan.
Recent Asia Foundation’s poll show, while less than one in ten Afghans have an optimistic view about the Taliban, a large majority is in favour of reconciliation though. Nationally, around three-quarters of Afghans favour the peace talks.
The Taliban have not articulated their vision for the future of Afghanistan. Do they envision a democratic state with elections? Do they see a role for women outside of home? What about girls’ education? What about ethnic minorities? The main challenge in the Taliban side is the lack of a manifesto or a clear agenda for the peace deal. Their only demands for coming to peace talks are withdrawal of all foreign troops, releasing their prisoners, and implementation of the Sharia Law.
Hakmatyar’s Islamic Party has accepted to start talks in exchange of a timetable for withdrawal of foreign troops or even while they stay in their bases. The Haqqanis networks which are closer to al-Qaeda seem more irreconcilable. Some analysts believe that by deaths of Bin Laden, Mulla Omar could now meet an important precondition for peace talk to cut off with al-Qaeda since he has not received swear an oath of new leadership of al-Qaeda.
The local population of the southern parts of Afghanistan which is under threat by the Taliban are keen for the expansion of the Afghan authority in order to alienate the Taliban who are not joining the peace process from those areas. On the ground, reconciliation refers to a broad societal process in the country which has suffered from more than 30 years of war causing gross human right violations, war crimes, empowerment of warlords and emergence of a culture of violence, insecurity, injustice, and poverty.
If the outcomes of deals will be some sort of power sharing in Kabul that bring the Taliban back to Kabul to turn back Afghanistan like before 2001, it will not be acceptable by majority of Afghans, and will not be tolerated by the international community. The leaders of Taliban have understood this reality. Accepting the Constitution of Afghanistan, putting guns down and breaking all ties with Al Qadeh networks, and respecting all achievements of recent years.
Despite of conflicting assertions on Afghans peace process President Karzai showed his intention in pursuing direct talks with armed insurgents. This initiative is completely different from the “National Reconciliation” pursued by the PDPA in the late 1980s. The key difference is that process the UN mediated a proximity talks outside Afghanistan while president Karzai directly engaged with the opponents.
4. Challenges and Obstacles
The peace process which was declared by the President Karzai gradually turned from a mere rhetoric to an effective practical instrument for stabilisation of Afghanistan.
A peace deal requires strong leadership on both the government and insurgent sides to force a settlement. It has been a decade since the Taliban fell from power and the “moderate” Taliban who wanted to reconcile have already done so. Mullah Zaeef, former ambassador to Pakistan, Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, former foreign minister, and Abdul Hakim Mujahid. Today the “moderate” Taliban members have already reconciled, and they hardly represent the Taliban on the battlefield.
Taliban has lost its status as a social movement, or even a coherent political organisation because of its terrorist acts that has not seen any changes to them. It will be a great challenge for leadership of Taliban to bring all its affiliation towards a peaceful political life.
The Taliban has had ten years to reject al-Qaeda and all their works, however, they have not done so. Some analysts believe that al-Qaeda has longstanding ties with the Taliban Haggani networks rather than Quetta Shura. After fall of the Taliban al-Qaeda has moved to adjoining tribal regions of Pakistan.
Deal with Taliban does not mean the end of the insurgency at large. It is unclear that even Mullah Omar can deliver all of the Taliban that he nominally controls in southern Afghanistan. The history of “peace” deals with the Taliban in Musa Qala Accord in September 2006, and deals between the Pakistani government and the Taliban in Waziristan in 2005 and 2006, and in Swat in 2009 were merely preludes to the Taliban establishing their brutal “emirates,” regrouping and then moving into adjoining areas to seize more territory. It shows that these groups cannot be trusted[2].
To expect an open Taliban declaration to break down is vital precondition or could be expect one of the outcomes. Taliban link with al-Qaeda is “more driven by history and family links than by ideology at this point.[3]”
5. Pakistan’s Role
Afghanistan's recent history has shown that without external support any uprising was isolated and most governments have been able to manage and control it. However, when the rebellions are organized from abroad, having a safe haven outside of country and being able to mobilize freely its fighters, forming an organic fanatical and technical supports, according to geographic characters and remote areas in Afghanistan, they can survive for years, and even decades.
It is noteworthy to add that in the twentieth century all of opponents of Kabul have been welcomed by Pakistan’s establishments as a result Afghanistan let with no option but to conclude peace deals with Islamabad rather than with its opponents. The peace agreement for withdrawal of former Soviet Union was signed between Dr. Najibulla’s Foreign Minister with his Pakistan’s counterpart after one and half year negotiation at April 1988 in Geneva; in spite of the official position of Pakistan in diplomatic circles was neutral.
The big shift in Pakistan’s approach happened when the Pakistani authorities stopped denying support to, and control over, the Taliban. For first time, they openly admitted that they are able to “deliver” Taliban leaders for talks. In February 2010, the arrest Mullah Abdul Ghani Brader being the second in command within the Taliban council, who established a direct contact with Afghanistan was arrested together with a dozen of high ranking members of Taliban. It was a clear statement that talks with Afghan Taliban are is not possible without Pakistan being involved. It seems that the Pakistan intend to keep their influence in the peace process at any cost.
In spite of friendly-brotherly relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the huge interests of economic cooperation, still some elements within Pakistan keep their strategic vision towards fighting against extremist networks in Afghanistan and in the region. Despite of diplomatic efforts between Afghanistan and Pakistan’s civil government it is still unclear to what extent the government of Pakistan can influence ISI and its Army in not pursuing their interest in Afghan’s politics.
It has been suggested that continuing conflicts in Afghanistan is to contain the India and western in the region. Thus, some sort of detente between India and Pakistan and regional approach toward conflict is vital for bringing peace and stability in Afghanistan.
6. US, UK and NATO’s Role
President Obama’s administration shifted U.S. military campaign from counter terror activities to counterinsurgency strategy (COIN) by a short term military surge to focus more on protection civilians gaining “heart and mind” of ordinary Afghans. “Clear, held and rebuild” are the main pillars of this strategy. In spite of this, increasing civilian casualties during military operations and night raids for capturing Taliban has raised public dissatisfactions and it has been one of the main Taliban’s demands as well.
US approach that General Petraeus has adopted, is talking with insurgents while continuing to decimate them. The U.S. believes on negotiation based on a “strengthened position”. The U.S. wants to “disrupt” Al-Qaeda and “degrade” Taliban to a level where they would be unable to return to power[4].
Robert Gates, about U.S. position on peace talks, said "I think the Taliban have to feel themselves under military pressure, and begin to believe that they can't win before they're willing to have a serious conversation." "... We don't want to end up having a conversation at some point with somebody who is basically a freelancer."[5] According to General David Petraeus, commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan in recent three months period 360 insurgent leaders were killed or captured.[6]
In February 2011, Secretary Clinton appeared to recast longstanding preconditions for peace talks: that the insurgents lay down their arms, accept the Afghan Constitution and separate from Al Qaeda. Instead, she described them as “necessary outcomes.”[7]
The UK has more other western country emphasized on a settlement base on “power sharing” and has announced its full commitment to peace talks including financially supports of the Afghan-led efforts to reconcile with those who renounce Al-Qaeda, lay down their arms, and are willing to work within the framework Afghan Constitution.
David Milliband former UK’s Foreign Secretary who chaired London Conference on Afghanistan in January 2010, proposed in a article in New York Times appointing a Muslim mediator by UN to facilitate talks and he pointed out that “The theory and practice of counter-insurgency leads everyone to incant the cliché that there is no military solution; but it is a cliché because it is true, so it is time that we stopped behaving as if there were a military solution and developed a political one.[8]”
7. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In September 2010, the High Peace Council with 70 members has been established under supervisory of former president Buranedeen Rabani to pursue reconciliation, it followed a National Consultative Peace Jirga in Kabul in June 2010 to bring an internal consensus. In its final declaration the Jirga supported the peace initiatives and laid the frameworks of a political solution[9], President Karzi who accompanied by the head of Jirga visited Islamabad in June 2011 to seek support of Pakistan in the peace process. In a joint declaration, both sides agreed to establish “Two-tier joint commission mechanism for facilitation and promoting reconciliation and peace in Afghanistan.”
Some commentators are in the opinion that President Karzi has postponed the reshuffling of his cabinet to keep sufficient free positions for those Taliban who are willing to join the government through the peace process.
NATO confirmed that it has facilitated these talks and will provide security and technical support. US has changed its language about peace and has admitted that they started contacts with some elements of Taliban while President Barack Obama announced the size and nature of the initial U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan nearly 10 years after 9/11[10].
The peace process that started by president Karzi and took momentum in London Conference in January 2010 is in the verge of implementation. It is worthwhile to mention that since Taliban need an “address” inside or outside of Afghanistan, Turkey agreed to allow Taliban to open an office in its territory.
On the basis of the Afghans constant demand, as a move towards peace and reconciliation on 16 June 2011 the UN Security Council removed the name of 20 Taliban leaders from its black- list. Eight others were released at the London Conference in January 2010.
Now it seems all doors are open and lines green for peace talks. In spite of all of these developments in recent months still many challenges and obstacles remained for starting a real peace talks with Taliban leaders and other armed oppositions.
8. Conclusion
Most of Afghan and foreign efforts have focused “talks about talks” and technical aspects of peace talks rather than required domestic consensus, considering neighbours security concerns and possible outcomes.
Obviously, the past cannot be returned or compensated, but with the new momentum of peace process which accompanied by U.S. and NATO exit strategy and transferring responsibilities to the Afghan forces by 2014, if all of these trends going successfully, in coming years a new chapter will start Afghanistan and region’s history.
Taliban leaders will gain many opportunities for the resumption to the peaceful political life, such as the formation a political party and take more responsibility in local administrations, particularly in southern and western provinces that they may have some popularity. As peace talks going on, it will split the facade of Taliban’s unity and it is called “holy war” will come to an end and a unique opportunity provide for Taliban’s leadership to redefine their demands and adopting themselves with realities.
Peace building is a process need a high level of internal consensus, regional confidence building measures and international collaborations. Coordinating and pursuing all of these consensuses is a tremendous task and challenge to President Karzai.
Political settlements helps to Afghanistan’s westerns allies to redefine their timelines for presence in Afghanistan after 2014 from military engagements to a sustainable partnership focuses on training Afghan forces, development and strengthening government institutions.
[1] . An incentive-based not necessarily works efficiently. The reconciliation attempts by Kabul government in 1980s encourages multiple side-switching and it was started a sort of competition to pay off opponents and tribal leaders.
[2] . Peter Bergen, Al- Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, testimony presented before the Senate Foreign Relation Committee, May 24, 20111
[3] . Thomas Rutting, The Battle for Afghanistan: negotiations with the Taliban: history and prospect for the future, New American Foundation, May 2011,
[4] See Thomas Rutting, The Battle for Afghanistan: negotiations with the Taliban: history and prospect for the future, New American Foundation, May 2011,
[5] . Ibid
[6] . Ibid
[7] . Alissia J. Rubin, Pressure Mounts on All Parties in Afghan War to Begin Talks, New York Times, March 16, 2011
[8] . David Miliband, An Endgame for Afghanistan, New York Times, April 12, 201
[9] . The 7-poit plan of negotioations was called “peace step by step”, the plans includes the flowing points:
- The Afghan government convince the international military forces that the war can not be win militerly;
- Starting int ial contacts between all involwed parties on confidence building measures which would include that the “ armed opposition” stop destroying civilian infrastractuer, Kabul release “ some” prisoners and the international forces stop all operations not approved by the Afghan government (including house searches and arrests), and are concentrated at some “centers”.
- A Jirga of mutually acceptable Afghan countacts the parties who will be tasked with working out a peace jirga;
- The Jirga Afghan informs all revelent forces about then procedure of peace process, secures UN and Islamic Conference support fro round table including security gurantees for the Taliban participants;
- The Taliban leader are de-blacklist, bounties on their head lifted and a ceasefire is called;
- A commission is stablished to organize a Loya Jirga;
- This Loya Jirag votes on the decisions taken in the round table discoussions and proceeds to end the war;
